Bence Obama'nın gelişinin altında, Abdullah Gül'ün Rusya'ya gidişinin etkisi vardır. Dikkat ederseniz 12 Şubatta Gül Rusya'ya gitti. 20 gün sonra "Obama 5-6 Nisan'da Türkiye'ye geliyor" dediler. Ziyaret zaten yapılacaktı ama, bildiğim kadarıyla erkene aldılar.
Obama'nın "Türkiye'yi AB'ye alın" diye ısrar ettiğini de bir hatırlayın...
Bunun altında da "AB kapısı kapanır, AB rüyası biterse, Rusya limanlarına yelken açacak bir Türkiye" korkusu olduğuna neredeyse eminim...
TSK komuta kademesinin Obama'yı dinlemeye TBMM'ye girmesi de bir acaip...
Herkes çok taraflı oynamasa ilişkiler çok basit çözülecek ama...
CSIS raporunu da biraz inceledim. Kuşkularımı haklı çıkaracak görüşler içeriyor...
Özetle:
1. Türkiye bağımsız bir siyaset güdüyor. ABD de başlarda buna şaşırmış, ama şimdilerde kabullenmiş görünüyor...
2. ABD, Türkiye'nin bağımsız siyaset gütmesinden ve Rusya ile yakınlaşmasından rahatsız.
3. Türkiye doğal müttefik olarak ABD'yi görüyor ama Rusya ile de "Abdülhamit Politikası" çerçevesinde dans ediyor.
Rusya bağlantılarını incelediğimde:
"Ergenekon Rusya ile işbirliği yapıyor, tasfiye edenlerin arkasında ABD var, ama hükümet de Rusya'yla iyi ilişkiler içerisinde... Bir gariplik var bu işte..." diye düşünüyordum. Şimdi resmin parçaları biraz daha netleşti...
Meraklısına ilgili alıntılar:
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"Ankara seeks fuller consultation from Washington on major U.S. policies and initiatives visà- vis the Middle East, Russia, and the Caucasus. It also wants to be treated as a trusted ally that shares many common values, even as it pursues distinct policies that advance Turkish interests.
Washington wants Ankara to be a reliable regional and global partner, at peace with its neighbors but not overly close to undemocratic regimes, and influential with its Muslim neighbors through its leadership and example. This role is best assured if Turkey deepens its democracy and pursues reforms required for European Union (EU) integration."
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"If accession negotiations fail at this critical juncture, the consequences would be severe and widespread. Europe would lose the support of a critical ally in a region vital to its national and energy security. Failure would likely accelerate the growth of nationalist and illiberal political forces in Turkey counter to U.S. interests and trigger even more obstructionist policies concerning NATO-EU cooperation and within NATO itself. Relations with the United States could also be damaged, and Turkey’s efforts to deepen ties with other international partners, including Russia and states in the Middle East and Asia, would likely accelerate."
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"Russo-Turkish rapprochement is a historic development that was in the spotlight following the August 2008 war in Georgia. The growing trade, investment, and energy ties during the past decade as well as the personal relationship between prime ministers Putin and Erdoğan have influenced this dynamic.
Turkey’s evolving sense of its national interests and its strategy of zero problems with its neighbors have led Ankara to a more explicit balancing of its relations between its NATO allies and Russia. Turkish officials insist that their cooperation with Russia is being pursued with a proper wariness and that Turkey remains firmly tied to its Euro-Atlantic moorings; however, Turkey’s geostrategic position has always been perilous, and a highly unbalanced trade relationship and Turkey’s energy dependence enhance Russian leverage."
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"Ankara feels confident that it can work effectively with Russia and other littoral states to promote economic cooperation and security in the Black Sea region. Ankara has resisted expanded NATO operations in the Black Sea, arguing that they are unnecessary and will only feed Russian fears of encirclement, with damaging consequences to its regional interests, including stability in the Caucasus."
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"Although the United States is not an official party to the ongoing negotiations, it does have a major stake in their outcome. The failure of Turkey’s EU bid would no doubt have a number of negative consequences for the United States. The collapse of the accession process could easily fuel nationalist sentiments in Turkey counter to U.S. interests. Turkey might then turn away from its Western allies and institutions such as NATO, where it has been an invaluable ally. Turkey’s growing ties with Russia and attitude during last summer’s Georgia crisis seem to underscore at least the possibility of such a shift. Alternatively, Turkey might opt to become even more obstructionist in NATO, blocking EU-NATO initiatives, joint planning, and cooperation."
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"From a U.S. perspective, a failure to keep Turkey anchored within Europe and the transatlantic community more broadly opens the door to the possibility of closer Turkish-Russian or Turkish–Middle Eastern ties. At a time when U.S. national security gives precedence to Iraq and the promotion of stability in the broader Middle East, losing Turkey as a moderate and secular ally in the region would be a crushing blow to U.S. interests. Furthermore, Turkey’s possible position as a NATO member state excluded from the EU could pose real problems for the future of EU-NATO
cooperation, which the United States is intent on enhancing.33 NATO has recently experienced a glimpse of just how obstructionist Turkey can be, as Ankara has attempted to leverage its position within NATO to pressure Brussels into action on the accession front. The Turkish government refused to approve NATO activation orders for both Kosovo and Afghanistan operations that involved cooperation with the EU. It is now clear that Turkey will not hesitate to impede NATO unity when it believes its interests are at stake."
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"Perhaps most worrisome for U.S. policymakers is the degree to which Turkey’s evolving sense of its national interests and strategy of zero problems with its neighbors have led Ankara to a rebalancing of Turkey’s relations with Russia and with its NATO allies. The convergence of interests between Ankara and Moscow has also been fueled by the rapidly growing and highly unbalanced trade relationship caused by Turkey’s energy dependence and huge deficit, a situation that further enhances Russian leverage in the bilateral relationship."
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"The Turkish response to the August 2008 conflict in Georgia spotlighted the degree of rapprochement that has taken place between Russia and Turkey during the past decade. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan evinced, for a NATO member, a striking neutrality toward the conflict.
He said:
Some are trying to push us toward the U.S. and some toward Russia. . . . One of the sides is our closest ally, the United States. The other side is Russia with which we have an important trade volume. . . . [I] will not allow Turkey to be pushed to one side or the other. We will act in accordance with Turkey’s national interests.
A second surprise came when Ankara revived its proposal for a regional peace mechanism— the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform—in discussions with Moscow and other regional governments without prior consultations with Washington or other NATO capitals."
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"The Russian leadership delights in trying to split NATO allies from Washington and puts forward policies that weaken the U.S. position of supreme arbiter in regional disputes in Russia’s backyard. Given Ankara’s deep concerns about violations of territorial sovereignty, which are caused by Turkey’s internal Kurdish opposition, Turkey’s immediate reaction to the Georgia war should serve as an unsettling wake-up call about how Moscow’s influence has grown in recent years."
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"Moscow’s powerful new economic leverage over Turkey was demonstrated after the Georgia war in a brutal manner that virtually amounted to blackmail. To pressure the Turkish government to invoke the Montreux Convention and not allow U.S. military ships to transit the Black Sea to provide aid to war-devastated Georgia, Russian customs officials began targeting Turkish truck shipments for increased scrutiny, resulting in massive delays and more than $1 billion in lost revenues for Turkish businesses. With hundreds of Turkish trucks stopped at the Russian border, Ankara threatened Moscow with retaliation, but then quickly backed off. Ankara realized that, as Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan put it, “otherwise we would be left in the dark.” An agreement to simplify procedures was reached in mid-September 2008, but it has yet to be fully implemented. Speculation abounds about a link between the temporary restrictions and Turkey’s support for Georgia’s territorial integrity."
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"It was also striking that, while much of the West was still invoking new Cold War imagery after the Georgia war, in September Turkey signed a contract for $70 million to receive Russian antitank guided missiles; this was Turkey’s first arms deal with Moscow in more than a decade. This balancing act seems likely to persist, as most Turkish officials assess the Russian invasion of Georgia as an aberration unlikely to be repeated if Russia does not again feel threatened."
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"It was surprising to Washington that Prime Minister Erdoğan first approached Prime Minister Putin before Turkey approached its NATO allies, the EU, or any heads of the Caucasus states to discuss the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform."
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